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Michael Andrew Smith was born in Melbourne on July 23, 1954. He studied for both a BA and 
an MA at Monash University, finishing there in 1980. His subsequent studies at the University of 
Oxford led to him being awarded a BPhil in 1983 and a DPhil in 1989. As a graduate student in 
Oxford, he was supervised by Simon Blackburn. Smith taught philosophy at Wadham College in 
Oxford  (1984),  at  Monash  University  (1984-85  and  1989-94),    and  at  Princeton  University 
(1985-89), before spending almost a decade at the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
Australian National University (1995-2004). He returned to Princeton University in 2004, where 
he is the McCosh Professor of Philosophy.  
 
Smith’s most influential work is The Moral Problem (1994), but he has also authored or co-
authored more than ninety papers, a selection of which were published in a second book, Ethics 
and the A Priori (2004). A number of the papers he co-authored with Frank Jackson and Philip 
Pettit were collected together in Mind, Morality and Explanation (2004). Smith has also edited or 
co-edited  four  volumes.  In  addition  to  his  well-known  work  on  metaethics  and  moral 
psychology,  he  has  made  important  contributions  to  normative  ethics,  political  philosophy, 
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. His contributions to philosophy led to him being 
awarded an American Philosophical Association book prize in 2001 (for The Moral Problem), 
and a Centenary Medal for services to Australian society and the Humanities in 2003. Earlier, he 
was  elected  Fellow  of  the  Academy  of  Humanities  in  Australia  in  1997,  and  Fellow  of  the 
Academy of Social Sciences in 2000. It is safe to say that Smith is one of the most important 
moral philosophers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
 
The problem that Smith confronts in The Moral Problem is the puzzle of how to reconcile moral 
realism with two theses that together provide us with a highly attractive story about how moral 
motivation,  moral  judgment  and  action  are  related  to  each  other,  and  together  seem  to  be 
inconsistent with the cognitivism required for moral realism (moral realists take moral judgments 
to be beliefs that are sometimes true). The first thesis, which goes by the name of internalism, 
states that a person who judges that it is right to do a particular act will, ceteris paribus, be 
motivated to do that act. This idea can be traced back to David Hume, but it was given special Companion to Philosophy in Australasia 
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prominence in the work of two twentieth-century Oxford philosophers, J. L. Mackie and Bernard 
Williams, who took it to pose a serious challenge to moral realism. Mackie argued that it is 
essential to the moral enterprise that we take there to be properties in the world that motivate us 
when we come into contact with them, and that a commitment to such ‘queer’ properties is not 
consistent  with  a  naturalistic  worldview  (hence,  morality  involves  a  fundamental  error). 
Williams argued that internalism places constraints on the practical reasons individuals can be 
thought to possess for acting in one way or another, and that putative moral demands cannot 
provide practical reasons for action for any individuals that do not already possess psychological 
states that could lead them to be motivated to act on such demands after a process of rational 
reflection (where this process, while it might lead to the creation of new desires, is understood to 
always be constrained by the desires that the individual already possesses). 
 
The second thesis that Smith focuses on when setting out his main problem concerns motivation. 
This thesis, the Humean theory of motivation, consists of a sharp distinction between the belief 
states and desire states that are thought of as together explaining human actions (a desire is an 
‘original existence’, to echo Hume on the passions), in combination with a contention that while 
desires play a crucial direct role in human behaviour, beliefs alone are not capable of moving us 
to act. Belief is in the business of merely representing the world, rather than attempting to change 
it, whereas desire contains no ‘representative quality’ (to echo Hume again; see Treatise 2.3.3). 
 
Cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory of motivation seem to form an inconsistent 
triad, since cognitivism states that a person who judges that it is right to do a particular act 
believes that it is right to do that act, and internalism seems to imply that such a person will be 
motivated to do that act, but the Humean theory of motivation denies that there is any necessary 
connection between believing that it is right to do a particular act and being motivated to do it. In 
other words, internalism and the Humean theory of motivation seem to together imply that non-
cognitivism is true, since if it is both true that moral judgments motivate us and that only desires 
motivate us, moral judgments cannot be beliefs.  
 
Something  has  dropped  out  of  this  little  argument  for  seeing  the  three  main  claims  as 
inconsistent (as I have just presented it), and that is the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause that must be 
included in the definition of internalism in order to ensure that the thesis is attractive, instead of 
implausible. Without such a clause, internalism would rule out the possibility of akrasia: judging 
that it is right to do a particular act, yet not being motivated to do it. But it is clear that people do 
suffer  from  akrasia  and  other  forms  of  practical  irrationality  that  prevent  them  from  being Companion to Philosophy in Australasia 
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motivated to act on their best judgments. Although Smith initially states the internalist thesis by 
using a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause, he goes on to argue that internalism can be understood, more 
specifically, as a conceptual necessity claim of the form, “If an agent judges that it is right for her 
to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational” 
(1994: 61). In other words, all things are equal just when an individual is being practically 
rational.  
 
It is important to note that Smith doesn’t think that merely recognising that the most plausible 
form of internalism is a weaker thesis than one might have initially supposed when setting out 
the main problem (ignoring the ceteris paribus clause, as I did above when explaining why the 
three main claims seem to be inconsistent) will enable us to avoid his trilemma. In a symposium 
on Smith’s book published in Ethics, David Brink contends that this is all that is needed to avoid 
the  trilemma,  since  only  a  strong  internalist  claim  is  inconsistent  with  the  conjunction  of 
cognitivism and the Humean theory of motivation (Brink 1997). Smith rejects this claim in his 
symposium response (Smith 1997), but even if Brink is right about what is required for there to 
be strict inconsistency here, Smith’s project can still be appreciated for the way in which it 
attempts to give an account of how, contrary to appearances, the three main claims harmoniously 
cohere with each other (as well as for many other reasons).  
 
The solution Smith provides to his main problem has many parts, but, in essence, it takes the 
following form. We can accept that belief and desire are distinct existences, and that no belief 
can directly lead to action, while rejecting Hume’s contention that desires are not rationally 
criticizable and thus not answerable to beliefs. In particular, we can form beliefs about what our 
idealized selves would desire that our actual, non-ideal selves do in the circumstances we find 
ourselves in, where our idealized selves posses fully rational beliefs and desires (so far as their 
desires are concerned, this means that they have a set of desires that are maximally unified and 
coherent). In forming such beliefs we are, in effect, forming beliefs about what we have most 
reason to do. We are also forming beliefs that can play a special role in shaping our actual 
desires, since it is necessarily practically irrational for me to not want to do what I judge I would 
want myself now to do if I were only more rational. This last claim is particularly interesting and 
original. Beliefs about what a fully rational version of myself would desire my present rationally 
imperfect self to do seem to be just the right kinds of beliefs to play a strong normative role in 
relation to my desires. 
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Apart from providing a solution to the problem of reconciling cognitivism with internalism and 
the Humean theory of motivation, The Moral Problem also provides an account of the moral 
facts  that  make  moral  beliefs  true  (when  they  are  true).  Smith  argues  that  when  I  imagine 
becoming more rational and more informed I must perforce also think of myself as converging 
with others in my fundamental desires. It is this convergence that assures us of the objectivity of 
morality. Facts about our normative reasons are facts about what we would all want our non-
ideal selves to do if we were fully rational and fully informed, and moral facts are facts about 
what we would all desire that are of the appropriate substantive kind (where our understanding of 
this kind is fixed by moral platitudes that are required for possessing the very concept of ‘right’ 
to begin with).  
 
Mackie’s concern that moral facts (if there are any) must be very ‘queer’ since they motivate us 
whenever we encounter them is squarely dealt with, since to encounter a moral fact (as a moral 
fact) is just to encounter the sort of thing that it now naturally makes sense to think of as making 
it rational to desire to act in one way or another, i.e. a fact about what our more rational selves 
would want us to do. Williams’ contention that moral demands will not necessarily provide 
every person with reasons to act (because some of us may not have desires that such demands 
can  ever  latch  onto)  can  be r e j e c t e d ,  without  rejecting  the  spirit  of  Williams’  defense  of 
internalism, because moral demands just are the demands (of the appropriate substantive kind) 
that all rational people will converge on. 
 
In his work after The Moral Problem, Smith focuses on a wide range of different problems, some 
of them fairly unconnected to the concerns of his first book. For example, the topics of freedom, 
responsibility and self-control are explored in the essays in Ethics and the A Priori, alongside 
essays closer in their concerns to his earlier work (essays that are concerned with moral realism 
and its alternatives, the nature of moral judgments, and the nature and demands of practical 
rationality). When it comes to normative ethics, Smith has elsewhere developed and argued for a 
type  of  actual-value  consequentialism  that  incorporates  the  agent-relative  goods  traditionally 
thought to be incompatible with consequentialism.  
 
In his metaethics, Smith’s more recent work is somewhat continuous with the position mapped 
out in The Moral Problem. Two closely related ways in which he has moved away from the first 
book – possibly due in part to responses from critics – are that he is now less sanguine about the 
possibility of convergence in fundamental desires under conditions of increasing rationality, and 
he has developed a more substantive and dynamic conception of rationality. Where he earlier Companion to Philosophy in Australasia 
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sees  it  as  a  fairly  easily  recognizable  conceptual  truth  that  we  would  all  converge  in  our 
fundamental desires were we to become fully rational, Smith has come to view this issue as 
presenting us with something more akin to an open question. He continues to hold that either we 
would converge, or there are no moral facts (externalists, on the other hand, would contend that 
there is a third possibility here), but his later work can be viewed as taking the threat of nihilism 
more seriously than his earlier work does.  
 
It is particularly tempting to think we would not in fact converge in our desires were we to 
become fully rational as long as one sticks to a fairly thin notion of what rationality requires in 
relation to our desires – i.e., as long as one sticks to the original idea that what we are after is 
simply a maximally coherent and unified desire set (although it should be said that Smith was 
already adamant in his earlier work that it is not possible to provide a reduction of the concept of 
rationality to other concepts). Smith argues in “Internalism’s Wheel”, reproduced in Ethics and 
the A Priori, that we should think of our understanding of rationality as itself open to rational 
revision in a way that is very much susceptible to being influenced by our substantive judgments 
concerning our normative reasons and the demands of morality (he admits that there is thus a 
degree of circularity in his theory, but he contends that this circularity is virtuous, rather than 
vicious). If the later Smith is right that philosophical accounts of rationality and morality cannot 
be developed independently of each other, then the claim that we would all converge in our 
fundamental desires under conditions of full rationality – a claim whose truth Smith still believes 
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